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Abstract 
This paper offers an exploration of various facets of the Israeli-Russian political relationship. 
The positive relationship between the two states seems unlikely considering each state’s 
history and strategic alliances, though Israel and Russia have endeavored towards a strong 
working relationship since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. This 
paper first explores the history of the relationship between the former Soviet Union/Russia 
and Israel from the formation of Israel in 1948 to the present day. The historical arc is used in 
an attempt to explain the development of the current relationship. Next, this paper explains 
the current status of the relationship, particularly through Vladimir Putin’s leadership of 
Russia and his diplomatic relationship with Israeli leaders Ariel Sharon and Benjamin 
Netanyahu. I then turn to the multiple facets of the strategic alliance, including military, 
economic, technological, and cultural partnerships. Lastly, this paper summarizes the 
implications of the Israeli-Russian alliance on Middle Eastern and international geopolitics. 
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Preface  
As I contemplated my Independent Study Project, the relationship between Israel and 
Russia was nowhere near my mind. In fact, I had no idea that such a relationship existed. I 
believed that Israel felt the same way as Western Europe and the United States in regarding 
Russia. The topic came to my intention one day during class at the SIT office when Dr. 
Csurgai mentioned the growing alliance between Israel and Russia. He chuckled, adding, 
“That would make a great ISP.” From then, my interest was piqued and I began my initial 
research. 
Now, two months later, I feel I have added to the academic literature on the topic. The 
relationship is fascinating, especially considering the history and environments in both Israel 
and Russia. Like the idea for my project, the alliance is unexpected, but surprisingly satisfying 
to research and on which to report. I must thank Dr. Csurgai for inspiring me to this topic, as 
it is research I hope to continue when I return to the United States. 
In the end, the Israeli-Russo relationship should be examined for its uniqueness and 
additions to world politics. My examination of the topic has changed my perspective on the 
Middle East, and I hope my work inspires further exploration, too. 
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Introduction 
 Without the Soviet Union, Israel’s formation in 1947 and independence on 14 May 
1948 would have been impossible. However, the Soviet Union’s support for a Zionist state 
and the Partition Plan seems to directly contradict the rampant anti-Semitism present in the 
former Soviet Union, as well as Russia’s positive relationships with Arab states in the Middle 
East. The relationship between Israel and Russia came to a halt during the 1950s1, and 
remained at a standstill until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Despite 
the lingering differences in philosophy and ideology, Russia and Israel have constructed a 
strategic alliance, impressively strong since Russia’s diplomatic re-recognition of Israel in 
1991.2 
 The relationship is complex and multifaceted, including diplomatic support, military 
contracts and practice, cultural and customs unions, technological cooperation, and energy 
contracts. Additionally, Israel became the number one destination for post-Soviet Union Jew 
migration, thus a large Russian-Jewish diaspora exists in Israel. In fact, Israel absorbed over 
one million Russian Jews, whom increased Israel’s population by approximately eighteen 
percent.3 The diaspora community has kept its networks in Russia, therefore increasing the 
connections between the two states. 
 This paper seeks to explain the development of the current relationship by examining 
history, recognizing both the depth and breadth of the current alliance between Israel and 
Russia. Through an understanding of the diplomatic relations between Israel and Russia, this 
                                                 
1
 Mark N. Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” Middle East Quarterly 12 (2005): 51.  
2
 “A Hazy Landmark,” Transitions Online, 2 May 2005. 
3
 Larissa Remennick, “Transnational community in the making: Russian Jewish immigrants of the 1990s in 
Israel,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28 (2002): 516. 
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paper will show the implications of this relationship for the geopolitics of the Middle East, 
particularly relating to the United States of America. 
 I begin with the history of Israel, the early relationship between the Jewish Agency 
and the Soviet Union, through the 1990s and to the current status under Vladimir Putin and 
Benjamin Netanyahu. Through this history, I will show the growth of the relationship and the 
motivating factors for continued development. Next, I turn towards the Russian diaspora in 
Israel. I will explain how the diaspora has influenced the development of Israel, Israeli 
culture, and lobbied for continued relations with Russia despite the anti-Semitism in their 
former homeland. Then, I will explain the strategic partnerships between the two nations: 
military, technological, energy, and cultural. Each of these subsections highlights the extent of 
Russia’s involvement in Israel and vice-versa. This paper will conclude with an explanation 
of the geopolitical situation in the Middle East regarding Israel, Russia, and the United States. 
The Israeli-Russian relationship is unexpected, but verifiably functional and robust in the 
world political arena.  
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Literature Review 
The literature available for this topic was limited, though there was certainly enough 
academic literature to form a comprehensive perspective on Israeli-Russo relations. In 
general, I believe the relationship between these two states has flown under the radar, thus the 
restricted nature of previous academic analysis. 
My first set of sources is historical, academic articles. These journals provide a history 
of the relationship, mostly from the strategic perspective of the Soviet Union. As Israel was a 
fledgling country, the literature suggests that almost any alliance would have been helpful; the 
Soviet Union, however, walked a tenuous line after World War II and into the 1990s, thus the 
relationship has been framed as a strategic move on the part of the former Soviet Union and 
Russia. Only the more recent literature has addressed the Israeli benefits of this relationship. 
The second set of sources is also historical, but focus on sociological and 
anthropological information. The Russian-Jewish diaspora in Israel has had a profound effect 
on the relationship between the two countries, as well as Israeli internal politics. I used these 
articles to develop my understanding of the cultural relationship between the two, in addition 
to the fundamental internal forces driving the relationship. These sociological and 
anthropological articles describe the Russian diaspora and the Israeli absorption of over one 
million Russian-Jews.4 Understandably, these works are only from the Israeli perspective. 
The third and final set of sources I utilize is news articles, mostly recent, that comment 
equally on Israel and Russia’s motives in the relationship. These articles show the 
“landmarks” of recent relations, especially new contracts, diplomatic trips, and customs 
agreements. Through this variety of articles, I pieced together a landscape of modern Israeli-
Russian relations. The news articles paint the relationship in both a positive and negative 
                                                 
4
 Mark N. Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 57. 
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light. For example, some Israeli news sources call for attentiveness towards the relationship, 
stating that the strategic alliance may benefit Russia more than Israel.5 Others point to 
Russia’s continued relationship with Israel’s enemies: Iran and Saudi Arabia. On the opposing 
side, these articles promote the relationship by highlighting the similarities between the 
Russian government and Israeli government, as well as each state’s devotion to fighting 
broadly defined “terrorism” both at home and abroad.6 
Within the past five years, there have been a few books written on the strategic 
alliance between these two states, though I was unable to gain access to these materials 
through either inter-library loan or the United Nations library at Geneva. These books are 
comprehensive, and should be considered in a complete analysis of the Israeli-Russian 
relationship. However, the newness of these books as well as the limited nature of the 
academic literature suggests that this subject must be explored in greater depth. I hope that 
this academic work may be used as a guide and amalgamation of current information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Azriel Bermant, “Israel should beware ally Russia,” The Jewish Chronicle Online, 23 September 2014. 
6
 Dorit Goldender, “Russia and Israel: Strategic Partners that Sing the Same Folk Songs,” International Affairs 
(Moscow) 17 (2011): 124. 
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Research Methodology 
 My academic research was conducted primarily through the examination of academic 
and news articles available from reputable academic search catalogs. The articles are from a 
variety of sources, providing a broad perspective on my topic. The news articles were not 
academic sources, but were verified and used to piece together the current state of affairs 
between Israel and Russia. The research, therefore, was primarily qualitative and not 
quantitative. 
 A majority of my work was conducted at the United Nations Library in Geneva, 
Switzerland, as well as in Nyon, Switzerland and Commugny, Switzerland. Most sources 
came from online catalogs accessed through my membership with DePauw University’s 
databases, though a few were found through InterLibrary Loan and with help from the staff at 
the United Nations Library. 
 In addition, I conducted four interviews in conjunction with my analysis of written 
works. I attempted to interview a variety of individuals: a professor and expert in Middle 
Eastern Studies, Dr. Jubin Goodarzi; a Russian Jew who emigrated from Russia during the 
1980s, Mr. Alex Safronsky; a former journalist with knowledge on the relationship, Mr. Noel 
Howell; and expert on Soviet Union/Russian foreign policy, my anonymous interviewee. 
Each of these interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and an hour and took place near 
Geneva, Switzerland. There were no specific ethical concerns in my research, though I 
addressed the ethical considerations of anonymity, confidentiality, and direct quoting 
specifically during each of my interviews. 
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History of Israeli-Russia Relations 
Since the early 20th century, the Israeli-Arab conflict has led to the Jewish question: 
should Israel be an independent state? Some Jews turned towards Zionism, the nationalist 
belief dictating the creation and continuation of an Israeli homeland and the right of return for 
all Jewish people.7 This question divided states into two groups: those supporting the two-
state solution, and those supporting an Arab nation, not an Israeli-Arab nation. During World 
War II, the Soviet Union annexed large parts of Eastern Europe, bringing over two million 
Jews into the USSR.8 The Soviet Union, however, took a contradictory position on the Jewish 
question. They supported Zionism in the case of Israel, but perpetuated deep and 
institutionalized anti-Semitism at home. Jews were removed from political leadership and 
most Jewish and Yiddish-speaking cultural institutions were closed. 
Before the second World War, Stalin suggested a combination Jewish-Arab state, but 
the official position of the Soviet Union switched as the post-World War II “Great Power” 
struggle became evident.9 The USSR was faced with combatting the United States and Great 
Britain for global hegemony, and the Middle East was quickly becoming the arena for that 
fight. Lauren Rucker suggests that, “Moscow concluded that if the Soviet Union was to 
succeed in weakening Great Britain in the Middle East, the Zionist movement was the only 
means of doing so.”10 The choice to support Israel, therefore, had little to do with Zionist 
ideology, but rather the Soviet Union’s self-interest and provisions to continue its role as a 
world power. Stalin viewed Zionism as a political tool, and manipulated the world stage to 
                                                 
7
 Gideon Lichfield, “Russia Invades the Middle East,” New Statesman 134 (2005): 34. 
8
 Laurent Rucker, “Moscow’s Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949” (working paper, Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars), 1. 
9
 Anonymous, interview by Megan Bailey, 14 November 2014. 
10
 Rucker, “Moscow’s Surprise,” 33. 
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use it as such. In April 1947, the then Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko 
announced the USSR’s newfound support for an independent Jewish state.11 
On 29 November 1947, the United Nations held a vote in consideration of the two-
state plan: the creation of Palestine and Israel and the end of British mandate.12 The Soviet 
Union voted yes, while also ensuring the votes of Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia. With coercion and political strategy, the Soviet Union almost guaranteed the 
creation of Israel, the Zionist state. In May 1948, the USSR became the first country to grant 
the newly founded Israel with de jure recognition.13 Moscow’s support continued when Israel 
suggested an arms contract in late 1948. Israel and Russia sent diplomatic envoys back and 
forth, and some Israeli ambassadors suggested outward support for the USSR in the Cold 
War. Israel stayed in the Soviet Union’s good graces until the early 1950s, when all relations 
came to a halt. Stalin had allowed the relationship to continue because he calculated that the 
benefits of an Israeli relationship outweighed the costs14; this attitude distorted as Israel turned 
Westward and the status quo in the Middle East shifted. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, a myriad of Arab regimes with nationalist and socialist 
ideologies rippled through the Middle East. Iraq ended its monarchy in 1958; Syria’s revolt 
was complete by 1963; many others followed suit.15 Israel’s alliance no longer appealed to the 
Soviet Union, as it instead envisioned a Middle East of socialist nations with the USSR as 
their model. With Israel planted firmly in Western hands, particularly those of the United 
States, Moscow found it necessary to take action to secure their role as a Great Power as the 
                                                 
11
 Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and the Establishment of Israel,” in Harry S. Truman, the State of Israel, 
and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East, ed. Michael J. Devine (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University 
Press, 2009), 76.   
12
 Rucker, “Moscow’s Surprise,” 20. 
13
 Anonymous, 14 November 2014. 
14
 Rucker, “Moscow’s Surprise,” 36. 
15
 Jubin Goodarzi, interview by Megan Bailey, 11 November 2014. 
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Cold War escalated. “The competition and rivalry of the superpowers in the Middle East was 
a central, if not dominant theme, in international relations.”16 The USSR gained the alliance of 
numerous Arab countries as it shifted its focus from Israel: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and 
Turkey. By the 1970s, the Soviet Union was the number one supplier of arms to the Middle 
East, though Israel relied first on France, and then the United States to provide its weapons.17 
Though the Soviet Union had supported Zionism during Israel’s creation, it declared 
Zionism as a form of racism in the 1960s. The opinion intensified in conjunction with the 
mounting tensions in the Middle East, especially with the Six-Day War, during which 
Moscow supported the Arab side.18 The KGB circulated propaganda with anti-Zionist 
messages and a majority of these pamphlets condemned Zionism as the next Nazism.19 Yuri 
Ivanavov, a popular Soviet propagandist, published numerous works declaring that Zionism 
was the next big world threat, that it was implementing a class system, and “dividing the 
Israeli working people by which the ruling class ensures itself freedom of maneuver and 
effective control and the opportunity to incite and fan racialism.”20 Despite the large Jewish 
population in the Soviet Union and the USSR’s anti-Semitic sentiments, no Russian Jews 
were allowed to immigrate to Israel. The Soviet Union voted yes on the 1975 United Nations 
Resolution 3379, which declared Zionism as racism and affirmed Palestine’s role as an 
observer nation in the United Nations General Assembly.21 This resolution was revoked in 
1991, aligning with the disbanding of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. 
                                                 
16
 Bernard Reich and Stephen Gotowicki. “The United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East,” in The 
Decline of the Soviet Union and the Transformation of the Middle East, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. 
17
 Goodarzi, 11 November 2014. 
18
 Mark N. Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 51. 
19
 Yuri Ivanov, “CAUTION: ZIONISM! Essays on the ideology, practice, and organisation of Zionism,” 
Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970. 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 Reich and Gotowicki, “The United States and the Soviet Union.” 
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The relationship between Israel and the Soviet Union remained non-existent until 1987 
when President Mikhail Gorbachev declared, “that the absence of diplomatic relations 
between the Soviet Union and Israel cannot be considered normal.”22 In following his 
glasnost, Gorbachev sent multiple diplomatic envoys to Jerusalem; these meetings were 
widely publicized and took place amongst all levels of Israeli society.23 Gorbachev’s motives 
were still strategic. The United States had a firm hold on Israel and had involved itself in the 
intensifying Arab-Israeli conflict. Its status as a Great Power was secured by its position as an 
arbitrator between the two groups. Since coming to office, Gorbachev had improved relations 
with numerous Middle Eastern countries, all in line with his idea of perestroika: Oman, 
Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, and Egypt.24 The final connection was Israel, which Gorbachev knew 
was necessary for Moscow to ever play a role in the peace process. Procuring Israel was 
equated to a secure position in the Middle East and in the world. The Soviet Union wanted to 
“portray itself as indispensible: to the Arabs, as the only country to press Washington…and to 
the Americans, as the only party to bring the Arabs to the table.”25 Israel gladly accepted 
Moscow’s outreached hand, especially as Gorbachev thawed the strict immigration 
restrictions. 
Diplomatic relations continued to improve after the Soviet Union disintegrated in late 
1991 and Boris Yeltsin came to power. As Yeltsin attempted to unify Russia’s political 
parties, most international policies were made to remedy internal politics, too. After coming 
to power, Yeltsin faced three distinct groups in Russian politics: the pro-Western group that 
promoted privatization; the centralist group that emphasized Eurasian relations and a slow 
                                                 
22Galia Golan, “Gorbachev’s Middle East Strategy,” The New York Times, Fall 1987. 
23
 Anonymous, 14 November 2014. 
24
 Robert O. Freedman, “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin,” Israel Studies 3 (1998): 150. 
25
 Golan, “Gorbachev’s.” 
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privatization; and the “old-line” communists who wanted to resume Russia’s role as a world 
power.26 To appease the internal forces, Yeltsin agreed with Gorbachev’s idea that Russia 
must have a role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The easiest solution was a renewal of full 
diplomatic relations with Israel. 
In 1992, Israeli and Russian diplomats signed an agreement to promote the 
development of Israeli-Russo relations, including political, legal, economic, and cultural 
cooperation, as well joint investment projects.27 Trade between the two states began and, by 
the late 1990s, Israel had become Russia’s largest trading partner in the Middle East. The two 
discussed Russian pipelines to Israel to promote energy security and worked jointly on an 
early-warning aircraft. On 17 October 1996, Moscow reinstated the Jewish agency’s ability to 
operate in Russia.28  The Jewish agency was helpful in Russian Jew immigration: “very well 
organized, teaches the Jews about Israel and Hebrew, buys them tickets, and helps them 
leave.”29 Russia certainly had motives to engage with the Israeli government, but Israel 
enjoyed benefits from the relationship as well.  Israel received a steady flow of immigrants, 
developed a beneficial and lucrative trade relationship, believed Russia could prove an even-
handed mediator in the conflict with Palestine, and hoped the relationship would dissuade 
Russia from providing nuclear assistance to Arab nations. 
The Israeli-Russo relation was only fully normalized in 1997, though the process was 
not without conflict. Russia opened a mission to Palestine Authority in an attempt to be fair, 
and even invited both Palestine and Israel’s leaders to Moscow to demonstrate their 
                                                 
26
 Freedman, “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin,” 142. 
27
 Freedman, “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin,”150. 
28
 Ibid, 157. 
29
 Ibid, 156. 
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centrality.30 Despite Israel’s motivation to continue their alliance with Russia, Moscow 
continued to provide nuclear technological support to Iran as well as send missile technology 
to Syria. This angered Israel, but the economic ties were too important to warrant and end to 
the alliance. In 1997, Russia denounced Israel’s actions against Hezbollah and blamed Israel 
for deadlock in the Arab-Israeli peace process.31 Without a relationship with Israel, Russia 
would still have a legitimate role in the peace process considering its proximity, security 
interests, and “long-standing connections with many other states in the region.”32 
Even so, the Israeli-Russian relationship continued without as much as a hiccup. In 
addition to the large number of immigrants, extensive tourism between the two began. 
Russian newspapers began publications for the Russian-Jewish diaspora in Israel; in October 
1996 Jerusalem agreed to build a house of Russian culture in Israel.33 Boris Yeltsin became 
the first Russian head-of-state to visit Israel, though he was no longer in office during his 
2000 visit.34 Vladimir Putin was the first serving president to visit Israel; his 2005 trip 
signified a complete reversal in the Soviet-Israeli relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 Ibid, 155. 
31
 Robert O. Freedman, “Israeli-Russia Relations since the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” Middle East Journal 
49 (1995): 244. 
32
 Reich and Gotowicki, “The United States and the Soviet Union.” 
33
 Freedman, “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin,” 164. 
34
 “A Hazy Landmark.” 
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Modern Relations 
 In early 2014, Vladimir Putin expressed his wishes to continue support for Israel: “the 
development of a mutually advantageous and constructive relations with Israel in the political, 
economic, humanitarian, and other fields will remain the priority of Russia’s foreign 
policy.”35 Indeed, since Putin took power in 1999, the Russian relationship with Israel has 
grown firmly into a strategic alliance. Trade has grown, the two states have signed numerous 
cultural and technological agreements, and an enormous number of Russian Jews have 
immigrated to Israel. The connection is undeniable, though the two seem unlikely allies, 
especially as Israel remains resolutely planted in the hands of the United States. Israel’s 
Western allies may be part of Putin’s attraction; Mark Katz suggests that most of Russia’s 
foreign policy is, “actually predicated on a desire to spite the Americans.”36 In other words, 
Putin may favor Israel because it can be used as a political tool against Western Europe and 
the United States. 
 Some experts suggest that Russia’s tilt toward Israel has to do with the two states’ 
similar hardline policies towards perceived terrorism. For example, the Chechnya region of 
Russia has held multiple revolutions, leading various Russian leaders to invade and take 
military action. Yeltsin invaded the region to squash the revolt in 1994, and Putin did so in the 
late 1990s.37 Most of the Western world has spoken aggressively against these actions, but 
Israel has vocally supported Putin’s policy of “not negotiating with terrorists and defeating 
them militarily instead.”38 Israel may see similarities between the Russian issue with the 
Chechens and their own “issue” with Palestine, Hamas, and the PLO, thus leading Israel to 
                                                 
35
 Jared Feldschreiber, “An Alliance of Necessity: Putin’s Russia Enjoys a Strategic Partnership With Israel,” 
Berggruen Institute on Governance’s The World Post, 1 July 2014. 
36
 Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 57. 
37
 Freedman, “Russia and Israel under Yeltsin,” 144. 
38
 Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 58. 
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continue relations and have increased sympathy for Russia. As few countries appreciate 
Moscow’s realpolitik and frequent military interventions, Israel’s role as an ally that approves 
has become important to Russian domestic and foreign politics. A poignant example of this 
importance came in January 2004 when Russia abstained from a United Nations vote 
condemning a security barrier Israel had constructed between Israel and the disputed 
territories.39 Moscow feared the implications of the vote for its barriers in Chechnya. By 
protecting itself, Russia also inadvertently supported Israel.  
 A similar situation arose with Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea. Few states 
approved of Russia’s move, though Israel stayed mysteriously quiet. If Israel condemned 
Russia, as the United States was urging Jerusalem to do, the government would also be 
convicting its own actions with Palestinian land.40  Israel took a neutral stance, neither for nor 
against Russia, though silence was a sufficient indicator. Israel was purposefully absent for 
the 27 March 2014 United Nations vote which officially condemned Russia’s annexation.41 
The absentee decision has become economically beneficial for Israel, as trade between Russia 
and Israel has increased since the Crimean annexation. When the EU, United States, 
Australia, Canada, and Norway began sanctions, Moscow banned certain food products from 
these countries.42 Israel has taken up this trade gap by largely increasing its exports of fruit to 
Russia. Additionally, both Israel and India have been approved to begin importing meat and 
dairy products into Russia.43 These agreements mean more money for Israel, security for 
                                                 
39
 Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 55. 
40
 Feldschreiber, “An Alliance of Necessity.” 
41
 Azriel Bermant, “Israel should beware ally Russia,” The Jewish Chronicle Online, 23 September 2014. 
42
 “Russia to import meat and dairy products from Israel.” Food Processing Technology, 29 October 2014. 
43
 Ibid. 
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Russia, and a stronger alliance against Western European will. Before these changes, Russian-
Israeli bilateral trade was worth over two billion USD.44 
 Cultural diplomacy has also increased under Putin’s leadership. When Putin first 
visited Israel in 2005, the trip was highly publicized and aimed primarily at awareness of both 
Russian and Israeli people. Putin made symbolic trips to multiple holocaust memorials and 
met Russian Jews who fought in World War II.45 He also met with multiple Russian-Jewish 
émigrés; one of these was his old schoolteacher whom now lives in Israel. Anti-Semitism in 
Russia has decreased slightly since the 1990s46, though only because the number of Jews 
remaining in Russia is a mere shadow of what it used to be: only 230,000 Jews live in 
Russia.47 The cultural sensitivity during his visit, therefore, was used as a platform for Putin 
to discuss his protection of all Russian Jews, as well as his plans to combat anti-Semitism in 
Russia.48 The visit, as seems a trend in Russian politics, was a combination of Russian 
domestic and international realpolitik. More recently, Israel transferred an area called the 
Sergei Courtyard, which was previously part of a compound belonging to the Moscow 
patriarchy, back to Russia. This 2008 move was an act of cultural acceptance and goodwill.49 
Moscow has also established a Jewish museum. 
 As with the Gorbachev and Yelstin administrations, Putin is using Israel as a method 
of penetrating the Middle East and achieving influence. Moscow’s attempt to be involved can 
be described as acting as the “honest broker”50 in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Putin has visited 
both Palestine and Israel to show legitimacy, as well as invited envoys from both 
                                                 
44
 Dorit Goldender, “Russia and Israel: Strategic Partners that Sing the Same Folk Songs,” 120. 
45
 “A Hazy Landmark.” 
46
 Alex Safronsky, interview by Megan Bailey, 12 November 2014. 
47
 Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 57. 
48
 “A Hazy Landmark.” 
49
 “Vladimir Putin and the Holy Land; Russia, Israel, and the Middle East,” The Economist 406 (2013): 54. 
50
 “A Hazy Landmark.” 
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administrations to Moscow for peace talks. Carefully toeing the line, Russia has even offered 
to replace Palestinian helicopters that have been damaged in various conflicts and sell the 
Palestinian Authority armored vehicles.51 However, both groups seem to appreciate Russia’s 
involvement. Palestinian President Abbas referred to Russia as “our precious friend and 
comrade,”52 while multiple Israeli leaders have incredibly positive personal and diplomatic 
relationships with President Putin. Former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon referred to Putin as a 
“true friend,” and this claim seems truthful as Ariel Sharon’s family emigrated from Russia 
and he and Putin often spoke fluent Russian together.53 
 Israel has reservations about Russia’s continuing relationship with other Arab 
countries, specifically Syria and Iran. In Syria, Russia has continued selling a multitude of 
weapons, including missiles, which Israel fears may end up in the hands of Hezbollah or other 
terror organizations.54 However, Russia has continually assured Israel, to no avail, that the 
Syrian arms are short-range only, implying Israel is safe from threat. Russia has also 
outwardly promoted Iran’s nuclear program, including vocal support and supplying both 
funds and technology for the endeavor. Moscow has claimed that the “nuclear sector sales to 
Iran are vital to the survival of the Russian atomic energy industry,” 55 so the sales have 
continued despite Israel’s discomfort. Israel remains the biggest advocate for far-reaching 
sanctions against Iran and, and as the Israeli ambassador to Russia recently suggested, 
“sometimes defensive weapons can become offensive weapons.”56 Russia shows no signs of 
slowing relations with either Syria or Iran. 
                                                 
51
 Ibid.  
52
 “A Hazy Landmark.” 
53
 Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 58. 
54
 Noel Howell, interview by Megan Bailey, 9 November 2014. 
55
 Katz, “Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,” 52. 
56
 Goldender, “Russia and Israel: Strategic Partners that Sing the Same Folk Songs,” 124. 
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 Overall, Israel’s current pursuit of a steady relationship with Russia may be attributed 
to four major components. First, Russia has provided first a flood, and then a steady flow of 
immigrants since opening the borders in the late 1980s. As a small and new country, new, 
highly skilled citizens are necessary for growth. Next, Russia provides Israel with oil and, 
therefore, energy security. In the future, energy and water security will be some of the biggest 
Israeli existential crises, so this security is imperative.57 Third, though Israel fears Russia’s 
relationship with other Middle Eastern states, Israel hopes their alliance with Moscow may act 
as a buffer in future conflicts. As Moscow hoped, Russia may have the opportunity to play a 
strong, negotiator role in the Middle East. Finally, over one-fifth of the Israeli population is 
Russian émigrés.58 A majority of these men and women still have connections to Russia and 
their families; positive relations with Russia mean a pleased population in Israel. 
 For Russia, the relationship is focused on pragmatism and money. Realistically, 
Russia still plays realpolitik, Putin’s specialty, and the Middle East is an essential region in 
world politics. To have some semblance of presence in the region, Russia must partner with as 
many states and governments as possible. In the case of any conflict, Russia wants to have as 
many allies as possible. As Israel has traditionally embraced the West, Russia’s infiltration of 
the Israeli government seems promising as a path to Western Europe and the White House. 
Second, the relationship with Israel provides Russia with a valuable trading partner and a 
large amount of wealth. Israel buys Russian oil and the two trade a variety of other products. 
The revenue created from bilateral trade is essential for Russia, too. For both Israel and 
Russia, full diplomatic and economic relations have proved worthwhile. 
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The Russian Diaspora 
 In the creation of Israel, one of the main purposes was to make a state “open to Jewish 
immigration and the Ingathering of Exiles.”59 On 5 July 1950, Israel enacted the Law of 
Return, which essentially gives every Jew the right to immigrate to Israel. Though the Soviet 
Union absorbed over two million Jews during World War II, none were allowed to immigrate 
to Israel; the Russian government had declared the Jews under otkaznik, meaning they were 
not permitted to leave the country. This situation continued until Gorbachev declared glasnost 
and perestroika in the 1980s.60 Before then, fewer than one thousand Russian Jews had gotten 
to Israel. 
 After relations began to improve, however, Russia’s immigration floodgates opened. 
Over one million Russian Jews have arrived at Israel’s borders since 1989, increasing Israel’s 
population by close to eighteen percent.61 Gideon Lichfield illustrated this concept best: 
“imagine the United States absorbing France, that is the comparison made with Israel’s intake 
of immigrants…from the collapsing Soviet Union.”62 This number of immigrants is 
enormous, especially considering that each of these immigrants must find a home, job, 
community, and establish ties with Israeli culture. Assimilating a flood of people is not easy, 
though the Soviet/Russian diaspora remains in Israel. In Russia, just above 200,000 Jews 
remain, merely a shadow of the previous population. From the most recent numbers, it 
appears that about one-fifth of the Israeli population is émigrés from the Soviet Union or 
Russia.63 As the first generation came during the 1990s, Israel is just beginning to experience 
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the first generation of children with Russian-Jewish heritage, but born in Israel. Israel survives 
on immigrants bringing new ideas, skills, and economic demand. In the grand scheme, the 
Russian immigration has benefited Israel. 
 Migration has become part of transnationalism, a concept of globalization in which 
nations can reach farther than states’ borders. Due to transnationalism, as well as the waves in 
which these Russian-Jewish immigrants came, most have maintained ties with their homeland 
and their language.64 The sheer size of the Russian population caused whole Russian towns 
and villages to appear in Israel. Integration is unnecessary for these migrants, as they can 
speak Russian and find a community with all the comforts of home without becoming Israeli. 
Still, surveys report that over sixty percent of immigrants say their dressing styles, eating 
habits, and other cultural markers have drifted towards Israeli patterns.65 These immigrants 
also brought their media with them, an additional way in which to stay connected with the 
Russian network. There are over thirty local and national Russian newspapers and magazines, 
as well as numerous radio and television channels and films. 
 The Russian-Jewish diaspora has also permeated the Israeli political structure. As 
these immigrants have full citizenship in Israel, they vote in elections and tend to be quite 
active in the political process. In Alex Safronsky’s words, the Russian-Jewish voters tend to 
be right wing and “hawkish,” more traditional than the standard Israeli.66 This group has 
formed a kind of ethnic political party, Israel ba-Aliyah, which effectively lobbies for the 
interests of Russian immigrants.67 Israel ba-Aliyah has formed blocs with other right wing 
parties; this strategy was successful in 2013 when the group led the polls. This immigrant 
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political party and the subsequent bloc has held major influence on the coalition government 
of Prime Minister Netanyahu.68 Russian Jews themselves have climbed the ranks, enjoying 
leadership positions in the Israeli military structure and Israeli politics. For example, Avigdor 
Lieberman has served multiple roles in the Israeli government. Now, he is Israel’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and leans heavily towards friendly relations with Russia.69 Lieberman was 
born in the Soviet Union, served in the Red Army, exiled to Siberia, and then immigrated to 
Israel. Numerous other political leaders share his Soviet heritage. 
 The Russian diaspora has not assimilated perfectly into Israeli culture; there have been 
numerous problems with this group. First, the Russian immigrants are generally poorer than 
the Israelis and tend to face difficulties in finding work.70 The skills they learned and jobs 
they held in the Soviet Union and Russia are incongruent with the current structural 
opportunities in Israel. Though the immigrants are generally highly educated, they still face 
difficulties in securing permanent work. Second, Israelis do not regard the Russian 
immigrants highly; the Russian Jews are generally stereotyped as criminals and cultural 
snobs. This stereotype may be caused by a cultural superiority the Russians feel over the 
Jews.71 The Russian homeland has been the center of empires, as well as part of the high 
European culture. The immigrants feel as though they are part of something bigger, something 
better than the upstart, technically history-less Israel.  
 The largest tension between the Russian Jews and the Israelis has been the perceived 
“Jewishness” of the immigrant group. The Law of Return applied to all Jews even if they 
were married to someone with one Jewish grandparent, which is a rather wide consideration 
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of Judaism.72 In addition, most of the Russians Jews are secular, being ethnically but not 
religiously Jewish. They do not speak Hebrew and are generally weary of Zionism. Some 
Israelis believe that the Russian are diluting the “Jewishness” of Israel, that they have created 
an “erosion of Israel’s Jewish definition.”73 The Russian immigrants are often referred to as 
non-Zionists and sometimes treated as second-class citizens. For example, the law states that 
only Orthodox Jews may be married in Israel, thus the immigrants must leave the country to 
be married or be married by mail.74 The non-Jewish, Russian subculture has caused additional 
problems to the perceived Jewish culture. First, the growing economy has attracted the 
Russian mafia, which now launders money in Israel against Israeli will.75 Next, the Russian 
groups have established their own communities that have specific restaurants and stores, most 
of which do not keep Kosher. This small change has become a bigger irritation for religious 
Jews who live nearby. In the near future, Israel will need to grapple with the tension between 
secular and religious Jews.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72
 Reeves, “On Multiple Fronts.” 
73
 Boas Evron, “Israel’s Shifting Identity,” Palestine-Israel Journal Of Politics, Economics and Culture 8 
(2002): 106. 
74
 Remennick, “Transnational community,” 521. 
75
 Safronsky, 12 November 2014. 
 Bailey 26 
Strategic Partnerships 
 Israel and Russia have cultivated their relationship beyond the political realm. These 
strategic partnerships cater to each of the state’s strengths, enhancing their bond and 
increasing their security in the relationship. First, Israel is considered a world superpower in 
military technology. Moscow has recognized the potential, inquiring into numerous 
collaborative military deals with Israel.76 Russia began buying drones from Israel in 2009 and 
was quite pleased with the result; Moscow ordered an additional thirty-six drones later in the 
year. 77 In September 2010, Vladimir Putin and Ehud Barak signed an agreement securing 
future military development and purchases between the two states. The largest deal, however, 
came just a month later when Israel Aerospace Industries signed a 400 million USD contract 
with Russia’s state-owned Oboronprom for the creation of spy drones.78 The Russian 
company will utilize Israel intelligence and design to produce the drones in Russia. 
 Russia has also called Israel a world power in the space and space technology fields.79 
Israel has reduced the size and weight of their satellites and have a singular unique practice: 
they launch their satellites westward, against the pull of Earth’s revolution, while all other 
space programs launch satellites eastward. Russia has sought to capitalize on these 
innovations, signing a space cooperation agreement in 2011. The agreement is far-reaching, 
including “areas like astrophysical and planetary research, space biology and medicine, 
navigational satellites and launching services, and other technology.”80 Russia hopes to send a 
manned mission to Mars by 2035, and Israel seems to be Moscow’s most likely ally in 
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accomplishing this task. Israel has also shared on Russia’s nuclear technology, including 
medical breakthroughs and dental imaging.  
 Israel and Russia are also linked through energy cooperation. This part of their 
alliance is vital; energy security is becoming more and more crucial, and their connection is 
essential for the Russian energy market and for Israel’s peace of mind. In fact, Russia is 
Israel’s largest supplier of crude oil.81 With the increasing problems between the European 
Union and Russia, the Middle East, especially Israel, has become a more viable market for 
Russia. As of February 2013, Moscow has also invested in Israeli liquefied natural gas, a 
future boom in the energy game.82 The Russians have already advanced loans worth over 3.5 
billion USD for excavation of the Tamar and Dalit fields, just offshore of Israel. Russian 
money has become essential to this Israeli project, and Israel is happy to oblige in the 
permanent energy partnership. At the beginning of 2014, Russia and Israel began talks about a 
contract for join renewable energy research as well. 
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Russia, Israel, and Geopolitics 
 The Israeli-Russo relationship has implications beyond the two states. As Russia has 
made a point of becoming involved in the Middle East, Moscow has significantly impacted 
the region’s geopolitics. As discussed earlier, Russia has created a number of “friends” in the 
Middle East: Israel, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, among others.83 All things considered, 
Russia has balance these relationships fairly well considering the tensions between multiple 
countries in the Middle East. Russia’s alliances range from technological, like Iraq, military, 
like Syria, commercial, like Turkey, or some other combination. Essentially, Russia has made 
the Middle East dependent on its participation in regional politics. Moscow supports the 
economies of Middle Eastern countries and plays the “good cop” to the West’s “bad cop” in 
many situations.84 
 Though not located in the Middle East, Russia has done its best to become an 
important player in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, Russia has loudly described itself 
as the honest broker between the two sides, hoping to become indispensible to both the Arab 
nations and Israel.85 Putin has visited Israel multiple times now and both sends and receives 
diplomatic envoys from the Israeli government.86 However, Moscow has also received leaders 
from the Palestinian side, including the Palestinian Labour Organization and Hamas. Russia 
typically sympathizes with the Palestinian perspective in United Nations’ votes and has 
replaced helicopters destroyed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.87 Still, Israel has made few 
complaints about Russia’s “double agent” role. As per his goal, Putin has made his 
government indispensible in the peace process. Because the Middle East is such a volatile 
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region, whatever country or whoever’s government can manage to mitigate tension will have 
power on the global stage: Russia’s end goal. 
 The United States should also be concerned of the geopolitical implications of 
Russia’s influence in the Middle East. As many experts have described, Israel has always 
been tucked firmly in the United States’ pocket,88 allied with the West. Israel’s relationship 
with Russia challenges this perception. This effect was already seen in the condemnation of 
the Crimean annexation; Western Europe and the United States pressured Israel to condemn 
Russia’s actions, but Israel was conveniently absent from the United Nations vote doing so.89 
This example is not completely telling, though it does show the interesting position that Israel 
has been placed in, balancing the support of, arguably, two world powers who do not have 
good relations. Western Europe’s sanctions were Israel’s gain, so there may even be an 
incentive for Israel to hope for tension between its two allies. 
 Russia’s relationship with Israel allows Putin and Moscow leverage of the United 
States. As Freedman described, “by maintaining good ties with Israel, Russia apparently 
hopes to keep an open door to the White House even when Russian-American ties become 
strained.”90 The alliance between Russia and Israel means the United States must consider its 
future in the Middle East and how it will market itself as a broker in the Israeli-Arab peace 
process, among other relevant Middle Eastern issues. Moscow has made many more Middle 
Eastern connections that the United States and has better geographic proximity, which means 
Russia may make a better ally in time-sensitive situations. Overall, both Russia and the 
United States are utilizing the Middle East in an attempt to define and sustain their 
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geopolitical power on a global scale. Both states often have the same goal, but differ in their 
methodology.  
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Prospective 
 As the last component of my research, I would like to explore two future scenarios for 
the relationship between Russia and Israel. First, the possibility of the West and Israel turning 
away from each other; second, the possibility of Moscow’s complete turn towards the Arab 
Middle Eastern countries. 
 The West turning completely from Israel seems highly unlikely, as the United States 
would find a difficult time ignoring Israel and their past relationship, as well as the loud 
Israeli lobby in Washington. However, some Western European countries have been more 
receptive to the idea of Palestine; consider Sweden as it has recently diplomatically 
recognized Palestine.91 If this situation did occur, Israel would certainly turn to Russia as its 
protector, and most likely face additional pressure in reaching a deal with the Palestinians. If 
Israel did concede to the pressure, Russia would delight in this situation. Both Israel and 
Palestine would be likely to choose Russia to serve in a mediating capacity, further increasing 
Russia’s involvement in the Middle East. Additionally, Moscow could claim credit when 
some semblance of an agreement was reached.92 Regardless, economic, technological, and 
diplomatic ties with Israel would continue for as long as Russia saw beneficial for its own 
needs. 
 The second situation, Russia abandoning the relationship with Israel, is also unlikely 
due to the cultural and economic relationships between the two. However, if Russia were to 
streamline their Middle Eastern approach to only Arab nations, Israel would suffer more than 
Russia. As Russia provides energy as well as a trade market for the Israelis, the termination of 
the alliance would be quite harmful. If this situation were to occur, Israel would still be 
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pressured into reaching an agreement with the Palestinians, though Russia would be the party 
doing a majority of the pressuring. Russia would struggle very little and have fewer restraints 
in supplying Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as well as helping to arm the Palestinians. Still, Russia 
would face continued, and possibly stronger, opposition from Western Europe and the United 
States, as the West would surely continue their embrace of Israel. This situation is, perhaps, as 
unlikely as the first, though would certainly change the dynamics in the Middle East. 
 In the end, the most likely scenario for the future of the alliance is continued growth as 
is. Israel will continue to be allied with the West, while having a soft spot for Russia and 
Putin. Moscow will continue to build relationships with multiple states in the Middle East 
while holding Israel in a distinct position. The alliance between the two will grow, to the 
dismay of the West, though there will be no interference. When the time comes for an Arab-
Israeli peace, I believe Russia will play a large role in mediating the conflict. 
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Conclusion 
 From Israel’s beginning in the 1940s, the Israeli-Russo relationship has been 
complicated and multi-faceted. Despite the Soviet Union’s prevalent role in Israel’s creation, 
ties soon disintegrated and did not fully return until the 1990s. Since Yeltsin came to power, 
Russia and Israel have enjoyed a swiftly growing relationship that includes economic, 
cultural, technological, environmental, and energy diplomacy. Israel and Russia are connected 
in numerous, permanent ways. Russians even make up close to fifteen percent of the Israeli 
population. The alliance is undeniable, though it has largely been ignored by both academia 
and other states. 
Israel-Russo relations have implications beyond Israel and Russia’s borders. Their 
alliance has affected politics across the Middle East, as well as in the United States and, to 
some degree, Western Europe. Their current diplomatic ties are relatively new, having 
developed within the past twenty-five years, but are sure to grow and become more 
complicated as time goes on. Russia enjoys relations with multiple countries in the Middle 
East, and Israel enjoys strong relations with the West. Still, their contradictory positions 
function to create an incredible strategic alliance between the two. 
It is clear that Russia will continue to play a large role in the Middle East, including in 
Israel. The alliance is strategic, strong, and growing. Overall, the relationship between Israel 
and Russia seems unlikely and complicated, but must be considered in an accurate analysis of 
Middle Eastern geopolitics and the state of global power.  
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